This text constitutes an analytical intervention in response to the article published on Homo-Naturalis.gr on 14 December 2025, concerning the political and strategic responsibility of the entire Greek party system in the face of an accelerating geopolitical threat.
The analysis deliberately distinguishes between political responsibility, historical horizon, and strategic realism, avoiding rhetorical excess while refusing moral neutrality. The aim is not partisan critique, but a historically grounded assessment of Greece’s position within a rapidly transforming international order, marked by the return of raw power, authoritarian revisionism, and the fragmentation of Western unity.
Greece is confronting not a temporary crisis but a profound transformation of the international order. The Greek political system bears responsibility not for isolated errors, but for its failure to adapt strategically to a world defined by renewed power politics and weakened Western cohesion. Legal institutionalization of disputes, strategic realism toward Turkey and Europe, and abandonment of obsolete geopolitical assumptions are no longer optional. Delay itself has become a strategic liability.
By diotima
I. Political Responsibility: Not “High Treason” as a Slogan, but as a Historical Fact
The accusation articulated in the original text is not rhetorical exaggeration. It is a political diagnosis.
The responsibility of the Greek party system does not lie in isolated policy mistakes, but in a conscious refusal to adapt to a world that has already changed.
Three core failures define this responsibility:
- Strategic Delusion
Across the political spectrum, decision-makers still operate under the obsolete assumption that: “The West is unified, the United States guarantees stability, and Europe follows.”
This assumption is no longer valid. Repeating it today constitutes deliberate self-deception — and public deception. - Patriotism as Domestic Spectacle
Nationalist rhetoric in parliament is not addressed to allies or adversaries, but to a domestic audience. It functions as a substitute for strategy, not as its expression. - Delay in the Face of the Inevitable
The avoidance of the International Court of Justice, the maintenance of symbolic vetoes, and the constant postponement “until conditions mature” all amount to choosing time in favor of the adversary.
History does not forgive such choices. No court is required for judgment; outcomes serve as verdicts.
II. Historical Horizon: Greece in a Zone of Imperial Reconfiguration
This is not merely a “crisis.”
It is a systemic transition.
The post-1991 international order has ended. We are entering an era characterized by:
- multiple centers of power,
- the return of coercive force,
- and the fragmentation of alliances into temporary arrangements of interest.
Greece lies within a triple friction zone:
- Russian revisionism,
- Turkish neo-imperial ambition,
- and a West undergoing internal strategic disintegration.
Historically, small states in such zones face only two outcomes:
- They become nodes of legality, institutions, and norms, or
- They become testing grounds for the power of others.
Greece has yet to make a clear, irreversible choice in favor of the first option. That ambiguity is the danger.
III. Strategic Realism: What Is Possible, What Is Not, and What Is Urgent
Let us speak without illusions.
1. The Hague Is Not a Concession — It Is a Shield
Recourse to international adjudication:
- does not legitimize Turkish claims,
- does not undermine sovereignty,
- but freezes the adversary’s freedom of military initiative.
In an era where power tests boundaries, the only real deterrent is the cost of legitimacy. Refusing legal arbitration leaves the field open and sustains strategic ambiguity to Greece’s detriment.
2. Lifting the Veto Is a Tool, Not a Gift
A veto is not a strategy when it:
- produces no leverage,
- yields no tangible results,
- and fails to prevent the adversary’s empowerment through alternative channels.
Conditional European integration constrains, institutionalizes, and delays revisionism. Exclusion, by contrast, liberates it.
3. War Never Comes “Suddenly” — It Is Prepared
The threat “we will come one night” is not a momentary provocation. It is a strategy of attrition:
- incremental escalation,
- public fatigue,
- and systematic testing of responses.
Those who dismiss it have not studied history.
Conclusion
I do not consider the Greek political system unintelligent.
I consider it structurally inadequate for the century that has begun.
The crime is not treason in the narrow legal sense.
It is the persistent attachment to a world that no longer exists.
History is unforgiving toward those who:
- perceive change,
- recognize danger,
- and fail to act in time.
There are no more alibis.
Time — not enemies — is now the most decisive adversary.