The Asia Minor campaign was a tragedy from the very moment it was conceived and decided upon by the so-called “patriotic” political and military establishment. With the willing, of course, support (read: propaganda) of that perennial curse of societies in every era — the “Goebbelses” — who, just a few decades earlier, during the Greco-Turkish war of 1897, had been among the main instigators of that other tragedy.
We have analyzed here the reasons why this campaign should never have taken place and why it ended, with historical inevitability, in catastrophe. The main causes were the following: First, Greece had absolutely no reason to invade those territories. Second, once this doomed undertaking had been launched, it was a grave crime that its planners decided to proceed unprepared and without any form of coverage, in order to reach Ankara — a decision that led to the well-known decimation of the army at the Sakarya River.
Decisive for the course of the campaign and its tragic outcome was, among many other factors, the contribution of Stalin. The butcher of his own comrades and the architect of the Ukrainian famine (Holodomor) provided every kind of assistance to Kemal for his victorious advance.
It is this “Russian finger” — and this is the issue we are addressing today — that once again in our own time appears to play a serious role in the evolution of so-called national issues, and especially in Greek-Turkish relations. Stalin’s position is today occupied, with no great differences from him, by Putin, also known as the New Hitler of Russia.
Putin is a ruthless leader of a superpower, one of those figures who, in various historical periods, appear ready to plunge the world into bloodshed. Thoughtless, unphilosophical, uncultivated, and perverse (as most forms of power, after all, tend to be), his presence and his tragic contribution to shaping our contemporary historical reality coincides with that of the equally erratic and psychologically akin far-right president of the United States, Donald Trump. “Exactly the same!”
Their presence and unpredictable actions as leaders of superpowers have altered the geopolitical map of our region, with their stance directly affecting Greek-Turkish issues. Everything suggests that, although Greece is indeed assessed as a country of significant interest by both leaders, Turkey appears to rank higher, with the balance clearly tipping in favor of the neighboring state.
On the other hand, the president of Turkey, Tayyip Erdoğan, is well known for playing on many boards. He belongs to NATO, condemns Putin’s invasion of Ukraine, ardently desires his country’s accession to the European Union, yet at the same time does not hesitate to maintain open channels of communication with the Russian dictator and his American counterpart, sharing with them their concerns about the… state of decline of the West.
And it is precisely here that the great danger lies. The Turkish president, for several years now, has launched a “war of nerves” against our country, as he does not hesitate each time to come out and threaten that “we will come one night, suddenly.”
And the question is: where exactly will Erdoğan come overnight? To Kalamata or Corfu? Where else? To the Greek islands of the Aegean or to Thrace. And he has his reasons. We have repeatedly highlighted and analyzed them here, especially after the Russian dictator’s second invasion of Ukraine. We briefly reiterate the most important ones, which also constitute the main differences between the two countries:
The militarization of the Dodecanese, in violation of the terms of the relevant treaties, which explicitly and categorically prohibit the presence of Greek armed forces on this island complex.
Turkey claims that Greek islands (such as Kastellorizo, Rhodes, and Crete) have no right to a continental shelf/EEZ because they lack a natural extension.
The issuance of NAVTEX notices for research and activities in areas overlapping with the Greek continental shelf is considered arbitrary. Delimitation requires either mutual agreement or a judicial ruling.
Greece asserts its right to extend its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles. Turkey considers such an action a casus belli.
The authoritarian behavior of the Greek state toward the Muslim (read: Turkish) minority of Thrace, in violation of the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne.
We have listed part of the catalogue of differences between the two countries. These differences are real and persist to this day, since no international body has yet ruled on the justice of either side’s claims. What is tragic — and at the same time disastrous — is that for so many years there has been no political will on the part of either country to resolve these differences, substantive or not, through joint recourse to the International Court of Justice in The Hague.
This, in turn, means that the pretexts for an invasion and occupation of Greek territory by Turkey exist. And unfortunately, they are served on a platter by Greek governments themselves, through their insistence on rigid positions, the drawing of “red lines,” and their refusal to cooperate on a joint appeal to an international court that would rule, without conditions, on the resolution of the disputes plaguing the neighbors.
This is why for years we have insisted that the pretexts and triggers for the involvement of the two countries in an unpredictable war always exist — a war from which no one would benefit. And all indications suggest that Erdoğan, at this historical moment of his “wolfish friendship” with the two leaders of the superpowers, is determined to proceed with “fait accompli.”
And it is certain that if he does so — if tomorrow Erdoğan dares to “come one night, suddenly” — the Russian dictator will give his approval, since the pretexts he himself invokes for the invasion of Ukraine move in the same direction as those of the Turkish president. As for their American counterpart, also addicted to invasions, he will either “wash his hands” of the matter and look the other way, or openly take Erdoğan’s side.
And now it is time for Diotima to take over, whom we invite here to present her own views with the objectivity and historical depth that distinguish her.

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Diotima’s Intervention 

If there is one historical lesson that repeats itself with irritating consistency in the Greek space, it is the illusion that time and “allies” will resolve problems on their own. They do not resolve them; they freeze them — until they shatter violently.
In the case of Greek-Turkish relations, we are not facing a historical accident, but a chronic, structural problem, nourished by three sources:
Turkish revisionism, which is neither circumstantial nor a personal eccentricity of Erdoğan. It pre-existed him and will outlive him.
The systematic Greek refusal of institutional resolution of disputes through international jurisdiction, because every government fears the political cost of reality.
The geopolitical instrumentalization of Turkey by the great powers, which renders it “useful” even when it violates every notion of international law.
Turkey today does not threaten because it is strong, but because it believes the cost will be manageable. And this belief was not born in Ankara; it was cultivated in Washington, Moscow, and — let it be said plainly — Brussels.
Greece, on the other hand, has invested for decades in a strategy of immobility wrapped in patriotic rhetoric. Red lines without maps, rights without enforcement mechanisms, international law without an international court. It is a dangerous combination.
History is merciless:
When you leave disputes unresolved, they are not closed by morality — they are closed by power or by the decision to have them judged institutionally.
As long as there is no joint recourse to The Hague, as long as the casus belli remains tolerable “on paper,” as long as deterrence is reduced to communicative outbursts, the pretexts for a hot incident will exist. And anyone who believes that the superpowers will sacrifice interests for principles simply has not studied history.
If Erdoğan attempts fait accompli, he will not do so in a vacuum. He will do so because:
Russia will recognize itself in the argument,
the United States will weigh interests, not justice,
and Europe will issue statements.
The real dilemma for Greece is not whether a crisis will occur.
It is whether it will continue to proceed without a strategy for exiting it.
History forgives neither adventurism nor inertia.
And it usually punishes the latter more harshly.
— Diotima