Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Foreign Policy (Chapter 7)

 

Erdoğan Between the West, Russia and the Emerging Multipolar World

1. The Great Ambition: A Turkey That Takes Orders from No One

If there is one area in which Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to radically transform Turkey’s image and international standing, it is foreign policy.

He did not want a country that simply followed the decisions of powerful allies. Nor was he satisfied with Turkey’s traditional role as a NATO member whose strategic importance derived largely from its geographical position. He sought to create a Turkey with its own agenda, capable of intervening in regional developments, negotiating with the great powers and, whenever circumstances allowed, imposing its own terms.

This ambition did not originate exclusively with Erdoğan. Geography, military tradition, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the pursuit of regional power had long been elements of Turkish strategic thinking.

Erdoğan, however, combined these traditional aspirations with a new political approach: what is commonly described as strategic autonomy.

What does this mean in practice?

It means that Turkey seeks to remain part of the West without becoming entirely dependent on it; to cooperate with Russia without becoming its satellite; to maintain relations with Arab countries without abandoning its own regional ambitions; and to present itself as an independent diplomatic intermediary in international crises.

Here lies the central contradiction of his policy: Turkey seeks to enjoy the advantages of different alliances without always accepting the costs and obligations that those alliances entail.

This is not, therefore, a consistent policy of neutrality. It is a policy of selective alignment, negotiation and exploitation of international rivalries.

2. The United States: Ally, Rival and Difficult Negotiating Partner

The relationship between Erdoğan and Washington is perhaps the clearest example of the contradictions in Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey remains a NATO member and occupies an exceptionally important geopolitical position for the United States. It controls the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, lies adjacent to the Middle East, borders regions critical to energy security and constitutes an important military and diplomatic actor in the Black Sea.

These realities make Turkey valuable to American strategy.

They do not, however, mean that the two countries share identical interests.

The most serious disagreement concerns the Kurdish question and, more specifically, American cooperation with Kurdish-led forces in Syria, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in the war against ISIS.

Ankara considers the principal Kurdish organizations associated with the SDF to be extensions of the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the United States and the European Union.

Washington, on the other hand, cooperated with the SDF because it regarded them as an effective military partner against ISIS.

As a result, two NATO allies found themselves supporting different local partners on the same battlefield.

The second major confrontation concerns Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system.

The decision, made in 2017, was not simply a commercial transaction. It was a political message: Ankara would not accept having its choices restricted exclusively by its Western allies.

The American response was serious. Turkey was removed from the F-35 fighter programme and faced sanctions under the US Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2020.

The contradiction was striking: a NATO country had chosen a Russian air defence system, creating a major problem of trust within the Alliance itself.

Turkey, however, did not sever its relationship with Washington. It continued negotiating over military procurement, Syria, the Black Sea, Ukraine and regional crises.

As of November 2026, the US-Turkish relationship continues to involve efforts at rapprochement, with the S-400 dispute and Turkey’s possible return to the F-35 programme remaining important issues. This illustrates how difficult it is to separate strategic necessities from political disagreements.

The conclusion is that Erdoğan succeeded in making Turkey a negotiating partner that Washington cannot easily ignore. He did not, however, secure American acceptance of all Turkish choices.

3. Russia: Necessary Cooperation and Dangerous Dependence

The relationship between Erdoğan and Putin is one of the most interesting and contradictory international relationships of the period.

The two leaders are not natural allies. They have different geopolitical objectives and have repeatedly found themselves on opposing sides.

In Syria, for example, Turkey supported forces fighting the Assad government, while Russia became the Syrian president’s principal military backer.

In Libya, the two countries supported opposing sides in the conflict.

In the Caucasus, Turkey strengthened Azerbaijan, while Russia traditionally maintained considerable influence in Armenia and the wider region.

And yet Erdoğan did not choose total confrontation with Moscow.

On the contrary, he sought to establish a framework of negotiation in which the two countries could compete in one arena while cooperating in another.

Energy is a central pillar of this relationship. Turkey remains significantly dependent on Russian energy supplies, while cooperation over the Akkuyu nuclear power plant gives the relationship a long-term strategic dimension.

The purchase of the S-400 system also represented a major political decision to move closer to Russia, albeit at considerable cost to relations with the United States.

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Turkey adopted a distinctive policy of balancing.

It did not join Western sanctions against Russia. It maintained trade and energy relations with Moscow. At the same time, it supported Ukraine’s territorial integrity, supplied Kyiv with military equipment and invoked the Montreux Convention to restrict the passage of warships through the Straits.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative of 2022 also demonstrated Ankara’s capacity to act as a diplomatic intermediary.

Here Erdoğan achieved a genuine diplomatic success: he managed to maintain dialogue with both Moscow and Kyiv at a time when most Western governments had limited opportunities for communication with the Russian leadership.

There is, however, an important distinction.

The ability to maintain open channels with two opposing sides does not mean that one can determine the outcome of their conflict.

Turkey gained diplomatic prestige, but it did not acquire the power to impose its own solution to the war.

More importantly, its energy and economic relationship with Russia restricts its freedom of action.

4. NATO: The Irreplaceable Western Security Umbrella

Erdoğan often presents himself as a leader who challenges Western dominance and seeks a new international order.

There is, however, one fact that cannot be overlooked: Turkey has never left NATO.

This is no coincidence.

Membership of the Alliance provides Ankara with strategic depth, military cooperation, access to technology and intelligence, and a system of collective defence that cannot easily be replaced by bilateral agreements with Russia or other countries.

Erdoğan understands that Turkey can negotiate forcefully with the West precisely because it remains inside Western institutions.

His approach to Finland’s and Sweden’s NATO membership was a characteristic example.

Ankara delayed ratification of the two countries’ accession, using the process to demand concessions concerning the treatment of Kurdish organizations and other security issues.

This behaviour caused considerable frustration among Turkey’s allies, but it also demonstrated Erdoğan’s political method: turning institutional participation into a bargaining advantage.

There are, however, limits to this strategy.

Turkey can complicate the Alliance’s decision-making, but it cannot replace the strategic capabilities that NATO provides.

Turkish policy is therefore not about leaving the West. It is about extracting as many benefits as possible from Western membership while maintaining alternative relationships elsewhere.

5. The European Union: Economic Necessity, Political Distance

Erdoğan’s relationship with the European Union is characterised by a profound contradiction.

Turkey has enormous economic reasons to maintain close relations with Europe. The EU is its most important trading partner, while the customs union, investments, industrial cooperation and exports to the European market are vital to the Turkish economy.

On the other hand, Turkey’s European prospects have effectively stalled.

Accession negotiations, which began in 2005, have produced no meaningful progress towards membership.

The reasons are numerous: the deterioration of the rule of law, the state of political freedoms, judicial independence, freedom of the press, disagreements over Cyprus and relations between Turkey and Greece.

It would therefore be inaccurate to attribute all the obstacles exclusively to Erdoğan. European objections, political reservations and resistance to the prospect of full Turkish membership have also played a role.

Nevertheless, Erdoğan’s own political trajectory has contributed decisively to Turkey’s departure from the democratic standards required for European integration.

Erdoğan has not abandoned economic relations with Europe. On the contrary, he seeks to maintain and exploit them without necessarily accepting all the political and institutional commitments that full membership would entail.

Turkey wants access to the European market, investment and economic cooperation, but does not always accept the political scrutiny and institutional constraints associated with the European project.

This is a choice that may offer short-term benefits but carries long-term costs.

6. Israel: From Strategic Cooperation to Open Confrontation

The history of Turkish-Israeli relations is one of the clearest examples of the volatility of Erdoğan’s foreign policy.

Turkey was among the first Muslim-majority countries to recognise Israel, in 1949. For many years, the two countries developed close military, economic and diplomatic relations.

The Erdoğan era, however, brought a gradual deterioration.

A decisive turning point came with the Mavi Marmara incident in 2010, when Israeli forces boarded the Turkish vessel participating in the Gaza-bound flotilla. Ten Turkish citizens were killed.

The incident caused a profound rupture.

A period of rapprochement followed, but political and ideological differences were never fully resolved.

The war in Gaza following Hamas’s attack on 7 October 2023 and the subsequent Israeli military campaign led to another severe deterioration.

Erdoğan adopted extremely harsh rhetoric against the Israeli government, while Turkey actively supported the Palestinian cause and maintained political channels with Hamas.

In May 2024, Ankara announced the suspension of trade with Israel, while diplomatic relations remained effectively frozen.

This position has several dimensions.

First, it reflects genuine political and ideological opposition to Israeli policy towards the Palestinians.

Second, it strengthens Erdoğan’s image in the Muslim world as a leader willing to openly confront Israel.

Third, it serves Turkey’s ambition to play a leading role in Middle Eastern developments.

One contradiction must not be overlooked: Turkey seeks to present itself as a defender of the Palestinians while simultaneously pursuing a broader regional strategy that extends well beyond the Palestinian question.

The confrontation with Israel has now acquired a geopolitical dimension as well, particularly in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.

7. The Arab World: From Ideological Confrontation to Pragmatism

Erdoğan’s relations with the Arab world perhaps reveal more clearly than anywhere else the pragmatic nature of his foreign policy.

During the first years of his rule, Turkey sought to expand its influence in the Middle East by drawing on its economic growth, political stability and ability to present itself as an alternative model for certain Muslim societies.

The Arab Spring of 2011 created the impression that Turkey could emerge as a leading power in the region’s new political landscape.

Ankara politically supported forces associated with political Islam, while developing particularly close relations with Qatar and the Muslim Brotherhood.

This approach provoked strong reactions from countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The overthrow of Mohamed Morsi in Egypt in 2013 and the intense confrontation that followed placed Turkey in a difficult position.

Erdoğan realised that ideological influence alone was insufficient to establish genuine regional leadership.

He had to retreat, negotiate and restore relationships.

In the following years, we therefore witnessed a gradual normalisation of relations with the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

Turkey began seeking investment, trade agreements, energy cooperation and defence partnerships.

Qatar remained its closest regional partner in the Gulf.

This shift does not mean that regional rivalries disappeared. It means that Erdoğan recognised that Turkey could not achieve its regional objectives while remaining in permanent confrontation with the most powerful Arab capitals.

Turkish foreign policy thus moved from an ideological claim to leadership of the Muslim world towards a more pragmatic policy of cooperation.

8. Overall Assessment: Successful Strategic Autonomy or Diplomatic Opportunism?

We now arrive at the central question of this chapter.

What did Erdoğan actually achieve?

There is no doubt that Turkey acquired greater international visibility and an increased capacity to intervene in regional developments.

Ankara participates in negotiations concerning the Black Sea, intervenes in the Middle East, maintains military deployments in neighbouring regions and holds discussions with leaders belonging to opposing geopolitical camps.

This represents a genuine enhancement of its diplomatic presence.

There are, however, serious problems.

First: Strategic autonomy is not the same as independence.

Turkey continues to depend on the West in crucial areas of its economy, technology, financing and military cooperation. At the same time, it remains dependent on Russia for energy.

Second: A multidimensional foreign policy frequently generates contradictions.

It is not always possible to maintain excellent relations with everyone. Cooperation with Russia creates problems within NATO. Policy towards Hamas complicates relations with Israel and the United States. Regional ambitions generate rivalries with Arab countries.

Third: Personal diplomacy cannot replace strong institutions.

Erdoğan’s ability to communicate directly with Putin, the American president or Gulf leaders is an advantage. However, when foreign policy depends excessively on the personal relationships of a single leader, uncertainty arises over its continuity and stability.

Fourth: International influence carries an economic cost.

Military interventions, defence expenditure, regional confrontations and the need to maintain numerous simultaneous relationships all require resources. A country facing economic weaknesses cannot indefinitely sustain ambitions disproportionate to its productive and financial capabilities.

9. Final Conclusion

Erdoğan did not turn Turkey into a global power. Nor did he create a new international order in which Ankara could operate as an equal alongside the United States, Russia or the European Union.

He did, however, achieve something more significant than a mere improvement in public image: he transformed Turkey into a regional power with enhanced military, diplomatic and negotiating capabilities.

He made his country more consequential, but not necessarily more reliable.

He gave it greater freedom of action, but not unlimited independence.

He brought it to the centre of international negotiations, but did not ensure that it could determine the decisions of the most powerful states.

Erdoğan’s foreign policy is ultimately a combination of strategic insight, national ambition, political pragmatism and a personalised, power-centred approach to leadership.

Whether this policy will prove to be a lasting success or merely a temporary period of enhanced influence will depend on Turkey’s ability to transform its diplomatic achievements into stable alliances, economic strength and institutional credibility.

And here lies the essence of the historical assessment:

Erdoğan succeeded in making Turkey a country that everyone must take into account. He has not yet succeeded in making it a country that everyone can trust.

 FOREIGN POLICY

Sources and Further Reading

1. Congressional Research Service (August 20, 2026) Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations. Comprehensive analysis of US–Turkish relations, NATO, Russia, Syria, Ukraine and Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions. .

2. European Commission (2025) Türkiye Report 2025 – European Commission Enlargement Package. Analysis of Turkey’s foreign policy, relations with the European Union, Russia, Ukraine and the Middle East. .

3. Center for Strategic and International Studies – CSIS (December 2, 2025) Strategic Ambiguity: Erdoğan’s Turkey in a Multipolar World. An important study of Erdoğan’s strategic autonomy doctrine, Turkey’s relations with competing global powers and its geopolitical ambitions. .

4. European Council on Foreign Relations – ECFR An Outsider Within: The Paradox of the Europe-Turkey Relationship. Examines Turkey’s complicated relationship with Europe, its historical orientation towards the West and Erdoğan’s foreign policy ambitions. .

5. Congressional Research Service (September 15, 2025) Turkey (Türkiye): Major Issues and U.S. Relations. A detailed account of Turkey’s balancing strategy between Washington and Moscow, its NATO membership and its relations with Israel and the Arab world. .

6. Congressional Research Service – Historical Background Turkey’s Foreign Policy: Strategic Orientation and Relations with Major Powers. Useful background on Turkey’s efforts to increase its independence of action and its complicated relations with Russia and Western powers. .