Minister of Citizen Protection Michalis Chrysochoidis:
“There Is No New Wave of Terrorism”
Asked whether Greece is facing a new wave of terrorism, Minister of Citizen Protection Michalis Chrysochoidis categorically dismissed such a possibility. (iefimerida.gr)
The “Known Unknowns” of November 17
The Minister of “Citizen Protection”—who nevertheless failed to protect the victims of the brutal attack in Thessaloniki—now declares himself certain that this time he will finally capture the country’s “known unknowns.” All in the name of democracy, the rule of law, and good governance.
Would this be laughable? Not this time. It is a matter deserving outrage rather than ridicule.
Let us be serious.
The same question has persisted since the early years of Greece’s post-junta democratic era and remains unanswered today. The Greek state, as a permanent institutional structure that exists independently of whichever government happens to be in office, knows perfectly well who these so-called “hooded protesters,” “known unknowns,” and “terrorists” are.
If that is true, why are they never arrested?
If the authorities genuinely know the identities of those responsible for murders, armed robberies, and other serious crimes, yet consistently fail to bring them to justice, then something else is at work—something far darker than mere incompetence.
This is not a new question.
Yesterday’s murder of an innocent woman in Thessaloniki at the hands of violent hooligans and “anarchist-style rioters” once again brings us back to an issue we have raised repeatedly over the years: the “known unknowns” connected with the Revolutionary Organization November 17.
Let us review the historical record.
During the later phase of November 17—after the emergence of the Xiros brothers and Dimitris Koufontinas, and after the group’s appropriation of the original organization’s symbols, including its Colt .45 pistol and typewriter—it appears that two or three individuals of a completely different ideological background managed to infiltrate the organization.
They were not Marxist-Leninists, as both the original and later members of November 17 publicly claimed to be.
They adopted the same ideological language, and perhaps even arrived with recommendations from trusted members who accepted responsibility for introducing them into the organization. Yet, according to this interpretation, they ultimately served an entirely different agenda. Their loyalty lay elsewhere. They operated on behalf of different centers of power and pursued objectives unrelated to the organization’s declared ideology.
Alexandros Giotopoulos, widely regarded as one of the founders and early leaders of November 17, stated years ago that there had indeed been members who did not share the organization’s ideological background.
YET THOSE WERE THE ONLY MEMBERS WHO WERE NEVER ARRESTED WHEN MR. CHRYSOCHOIDIS ANNOUNCED THAT HE HAD DISMANTLED NOVEMBER 17 IN 2002.
Their names have never become public.
Nevertheless, the Minister has continued—both then and now—to present the 2002 operation as a complete success, insisting that every terrorist was arrested and that terrorism in Greece effectively came to an end under his leadership.
The facts tell a different story.
The Marxist-Leninist members whose identities became known were arrested, prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned. Their personal histories are a matter of public record.
Yet, according to this account, several other members—far more elusive and considerably more resourceful—simply disappeared.
They were never arrested.
They have never been identified.
And if they are still alive, they remain free today.
One may reasonably wonder whether they were rewarded for the services they rendered—perhaps even generously rewarded.
Dimitris Koufontinas, who became the operational leader of the organization’s later phase, continues to describe himself as an unrepentant urban guerrilla.
Yet, despite this, he has never chosen to reveal what he knows about these individuals.
Why?
Why has he never disclosed the organization’s hidden history or exposed mistakes that would help historians understand what really happened?
For example:
How did individuals of COMPLETELY UNKNOWN IDEOLOGICAL BACKGROUND gain admission into such a tightly organized clandestine group?
Why was it that, unlike every other member—whose family, social circles, friendships, and personal histories eventually became known—these two or three individuals managed to leave absolutely no trace of their true identities?
Did they perhaps operate under forged identity cards or false passports that even their fellow members accepted as genuine?
We should not pretend these questions do not exist.
For years we have argued that these were infiltrators.
They knew the identities of every genuine member throughout the organization, both at its core and its periphery.
The genuine members, however, knew only the false identities presented to them.
Once these infiltrators had completed their mission—altering the ideological character of the original organization, carrying out operations that served objectives beyond its declared political aims, and identifying the remaining members for eventual arrest—they disappeared without a trace.
To this day, no one has explained who they were.
Except, apparently, Mr. Chrysochoidis, who continues to assure the public that “the chapter of terrorism in Greece has been closed.”
But when exactly was it closed?
And for whose benefit?
As for the Minister himself, he once proudly identified with PASOK’s socialist tradition.
Over time, however, he abandoned that political identity and, like Saul on the road to Damascus, underwent what the author sees as a complete political conversion, becoming one of the most devoted defenders—and indeed one of the principal architects—of what might be described as the political creed of Mitsotakism.
Conclusion
In the end, every debt comes due.
Political debts are no exception.