Shoigu: The security of Russians in Transnistria is at risk
Russia “will use all available means” to protect its citizens in Transnistria, stressed Sergey Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of Russia.
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History does not repeat mechanically, yet patterns of power return wearing new faces. Transnistria may become another link in this chain. The crucial question is not only what Russia will do—but whether the West has learned from its past mistakes.
The dictator of Russia reproduces himself all these years he has exercised power almost verbatim—even in details. Especially regarding methods of military interventions in other countries, among his favorite tactics are:
a. The well-known, already since the era of Adolf Hitler, search for “ethnic” pretexts. Russian populations in other countries allegedly suffering under governments disliked by Vladimir Putin constitute his most common justification.
b. The presentation of such actions as defense of Russian security interests against the expansion of NATO.
Today, once again, he put his proxy, Sergey Shoigu, to “read out” the Kremlin’s announcement. And usually, after such statements, he begins unfolding his operational plans, starting with gauging the reactions of other countries.
This time as well, he appears to be preparing the ground—using Transnistria as a pretext—for a new theater of military operations similar to Georgia and Ukraine. Ultimately aiming at fulfilling the old Russian vision of the so-called “Eastern Question”: control over the Balkans.
We were writing almost 8 years ago (July 11, 2018):
The sums allocated by the Russian dictator to both Romania and Moldova, on the eve of their national elections, were enormous.
The “Tsar of Russia” was preparing to launch operations in Transnistria and Moldova, aiming to turn the region into a new Ukraine.
The flare-ups in Eastern Ukraine at the time, with dozens of casualties, showed that we were approaching new strategic plans. The tolerance shown by the U.S. leadership then constituted a window of opportunity.
But Romania is not Moldova. Apart from the roughly 3 million Hungarians in Transylvania, the rest of the population is homogeneous and cohesive. Its national narrative emphasizes that the country is Wallachia—a “New Rome,” Latin-speaking, with a strong historical continuity.
Romanian nationalism is uncompromising. Historical Bessarabia (today’s Moldova) is considered Romanian. Any occupation of it, along with Transnistria, would be perceived as occupation of Romanian lands—and this is taught from an early age.
Putin knows that here the conditions are different. There are no ethnic footholds as in Eastern Ukraine. The only remaining method is the familiar one: fragmentation of national unity through internal destabilization, “Maidan-type” uprisings.
This method—through populist and far-right formations—has been tested in several European countries: Ukraine, Greece, Italy, France, Spain. Financial leverage proved to be a powerful political weapon.
However, Romania remains a deeply nationalistic society. Recent demonstrations in Bucharest, with the slogan “Hands off Bessarabia,” sent a clear message to Moscow.
The region north of the Danube has historically been a limit to imperial power. History does not repeat as farce. Faces change—patterns do not.
The crucial question now:
If the “new Tsar” opens once again the “Aeolus’ bag,” what will be the stance of the United States as leader of NATO? Will the tolerance that enabled the interventions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia (2008) and Crimea (2014) continue?
Diotima’s Assessment
If Russia attempts a military intervention in Transnistria, the U.S. response will not mirror the past—but it will not necessarily be direct military engagement either.
The most likely scenario includes:
Expanded economic sanctions beyond the Crimea precedent
Strengthening NATO’s eastern flank, especially Romania and Poland
Indirect support to Moldova and Ukraine
Washington is aware that direct confrontation with Russia carries nuclear risk. However, unlike 2008 or 2014, the cost of inaction today is significantly higher.
In simple terms:
No “blank check” for Putin—but deterrence without easily crossing into direct war.