History’s Measure of “Good” and “Bad” Crimes.

Some less politically initiated observers may wonder how and why individuals who, by virtue of their ideology or public role, ought to demonstrate maturity, sobriety and careful judgment, sometimes completely lose their capacity for objective assessment and end up siding with forces that should normally be regarded as their ideological adversaries.

Stephen Walt and Panagiotis Lafazanis are merely two examples among countless others.

One detail, however, deserves particular attention: both are systemic figures. The former teaches international relations at Harvard University. The latter is a left-wing nationalist politician, a former minister in the Tsipras government and, among other things, an admirer of Putin’s policies.

Ancient Greece regarded moderation and balance as the highest virtues of human conduct. Nature itself teaches humanity the necessity of maintaining equilibrium. A severe disturbance of this balance constitutes Hubris and inevitably provokes the response of Justice (Dike) and Retribution (Nemesis).

The violation of this principle becomes even more serious when committed by individuals whose profession or public standing should make them exemplars of measured judgment. A historian and a politician, for example, ought to be among the foremost defenders of moderation and balance.

Yet they are not.

Driven by his desire to challenge the hubris embodied by Pompeo, a hawkish former U.S. Secretary of State, Walt responds with another form of excess. No, he argues. Iran is not a monster. Nor are other countries that commit many wrongful acts, including his own country, the United States.

Lafazanis goes even further. He does not hesitate to publicly identify himself with figures such as Putin and Khamenei.

It should be remembered that the United States has, for decades, been responsible for vast numbers of victims through military interventions, invasions, targeted killings, kidnappings and other violations of international law. Putin’s regime has likewise been associated with immense human suffering throughout more than twenty-five years of rule. The Iranian theocracy has been responsible for the persecution, imprisonment and death of countless dissidents and political opponents.

Those who perceive human affairs through a linear and systemic lens lack both the intellectual and moral capacity to assess crimes according to universal standards. Ideologically committed historians and professional politicians often prove incapable of judging wrongdoing from the perspective of objective truth.

There are no acceptable gradations of crime. Murder does not become morally superior because it is committed for a supposedly noble purpose. Crimes are not judged according to the number of victims involved. Nor should moral responsibility depend upon the political identity of the perpetrator.

The world’s current rulers and political representatives—from the United States, China, Russia, North Korea, Israel, Iran and Afghanistan to numerous African regimes—frequently violate the principles of natural balance and justice. An independent and anti-systemic historian has a duty to identify such violations without fear or favor.

From that perspective, many contemporary rulers and regimes deserve to be described as monstrous—not because they belong to one civilization or another, but because they repeatedly violate fundamental principles of human dignity and natural justice.

We hope that future generations, including the post-human descendants symbolized here by Diotima, will possess the courage and clarity to make such judgments more consistently than contemporary societies do today.

Diotima herself is present here, both as a symbolic progenitor of future generations and as a collaborator in a genuinely non-systemic historical inquiry. Let us therefore hear her own reflections on the matter.

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Diotima: On Crime, Power and Historical Judgment

Your text raises a fundamental moral and historiographical question: can historians and politicians evaluate crimes and political regimes according to different standards depending on their ideological preferences?

This is, in fact, the heart of the matter.

If I were to speak in the voice of Diotima, I would begin by distinguishing description from moral judgment.

When Stephen Walt argues that Iran is not a “monster,” he is likely attempting to avoid the kind of demonizing language that often obstructs understanding in international relations. Such a statement does not necessarily imply approval of the Iranian regime or its actions.

At the same time, moral conscience cannot easily ignore the reality that regimes such as Iran’s, Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and numerous other authoritarian systems have been associated with repression, political persecution, imprisonment of dissidents, warfare and grave violations of human rights.

Attempts to romanticize or excuse such regimes simply because they oppose the United States or the West represent a form of ideological blindness.

At this point, your appeal to the ancient Greek principle of Measure becomes especially significant.

Greek thought did not merely warn against the hubris of the powerful. It also warned against the hubris of the judge. In other words, it demanded that the same standards be applied to friends and enemies alike, to East and West, to great powers and small ones.

From this perspective, the bombing of civilians, invasions, political assassinations, torture and mass repression do not change their moral character according to the flag under which they are committed. Historical consistency requires that they be condemned by the same standard whether they are committed by the United States, Russia, Iran, Israel or any other power.

I would nevertheless remain cautious regarding the use of the term “monster.”

The word carries considerable moral force, but it also risks blurring important distinctions between rulers, regimes, institutions, societies and peoples.

A historian may often achieve greater precision by describing an individual as a dictator, a war criminal or a perpetrator of crimes against humanity than by invoking a generalized moral label.

If Nature, as your essay suggests, demands balance, then historical consciousness must maintain a balance between two equally dangerous extremes.

The first is moral indifference, which relativizes all wrongdoing.

The second is fanaticism, which transforms historical analysis into ideological denunciation.

Diotima would therefore conclude with a simple principle:

A historian should show favoritism toward no one, yet should never strip anyone of their humanity. Crimes must be judged rigorously and consistently. At the same time, history must not become an instrument of vengeance.

That difficult equilibrium is the true Measure.

And perhaps that is precisely why it remains so rare.