1. It is said that Thanasis Avgerinos, a key figure in the party being formed around Maria Karystianou, is expected to take over the press office of the new political formation. Avgerinos has served for years as a correspondent in Moscow.
2. Stratos Siourdakis stated:
“I also have a Russian wife, yes. But let’s first talk about the man. The Russian man is disciplined, he is a soldier, he is punctual, he is a gentleman. In general, in Russia, they distinguish clearly the value of man and woman. There is no such thing as… common… unisex… There is no such unisex mentality, none of that Scandinavian thing.
The Russian man is the pillar of the family, the one who brings money, the one who struggles, who will voluntarily go to war, who acts according to the old standards of masculinity. As for the woman… The Russian woman does not think, ‘I am career-oriented and I will leave children for later.’ She will put family first, and if necessary she will abandon her career because family comes before career.
She is raised to take care of herself, to always be beautiful. Just like women from Thessaloniki who dress elegantly even to go to the market, Russian women are like that everywhere. Raised to take care of themselves, exercise, wear makeup, dress beautifully, and generally be pleasant to look at. I think many Greek men already know this, since many have married Russian women.”
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History does not always return wearing uniforms and waving flags. Often, it returns through ordinary faces, anger, populism, promises of “national salvation,” and societies exhausted by crises and disillusionment. Europe now faces a new test of democratic resilience. And Greece, burdened both by historical obsessions and modern traumas, may once again become a crucial laboratory of political transformation.
“Even this spring, rayahs, rayahs, even this summer, until the Muscovite arrives, rayahs, rayahs…”
From the era of Ottoman rule, enslaved Greeks awaited liberation as a gift that would come exclusively from Orthodox Russia. It became almost an obsession, a centuries-long passionate attachment.
And despite repeated betrayals by the Russians — who incited the unfortunate rayahs for their own interests and then abandoned them to the Sultan’s sword — the illusion endured. Let us remember that in 1770 the entire Peloponnese was devastated. There was hardly a man left alive. Faced with this catastrophic demographic collapse, the Ottoman authorities were forced to transfer male populations from northern regions southward in order to restore balance and repopulate the peninsula. (How do you think that half of the Peloponnese does not have dark-skinned Venetians, but light-skinned Slavs of ancient Moesia and Albanians of Illyria?)
Yet even after liberation, the Greeks learned little. Once again they turned to Russia to appoint a ruler for the newborn Greek state. And the Tsar sent none other than his trusted former Foreign Minister, Ioannis Kapodistrias. Once more, the perpetually betrayed Greek realized what Russian domination meant: emerging from the Sultan’s yoke only to fall beneath that of the Tsar.
Today, once again, the Russians occupy a prominent place in the political and business life of Greece. Greek Putinists are proportionally more numerous than in many other European countries. Among them are artists, academics, leaders of fringe parties — what we call here “political formations” — and, naturally, a colorful mass of followers, mainly nationalists, anti-Europeans, and fanatical anti-Turks.
Well-known figures from the arts, such as singer George Dalaras, Natassa Bofiliou, and filmmaker Yannis Smaragdis, as well as political figures including neo-Nazi Nikolaos Michaloliakos, right-wing nationalist Panos Kammenos, Dimitris Koutsoumpas, Panagiotis Lafazanis, Yanis Varoufakis, and Zoe Konstantopoulou, are among the most visible examples of personalities maintaining either strong or loose ties with the Russian dictator and his principles.
At this moment, Putin’s presence in Greece is taking a new form through the emergence of a far-right party led by Maria Karystianou, aspiring to become a Greek version of Marine Le Pen. Karystianou, whose daughter died in the tragic Tempi train disaster, was until recently a voter of the conservative establishment. Now she has turned against her former political camp, demanding accountability — but only for these specific deaths. The thousands of dead migrants in the Mediterranean and the Aegean, the “wretched of the earth,” do not seem to concern this emerging far-right rhetoric. On the contrary, it often advocates harsh border protection against such desperate human beings. At the same time, anti-Turkish nationalism remains central to this discourse.
The shameless appearance and propaganda role of outspoken Putin supporters such as Thanasis Avgerinos and Stratos Siourdakis within this new party indicate that Greece — and Europe more broadly — may be entering a new cycle of political formations supported by prominent pro-Russian voices and generously funded with “silver spears” paid in rubles.
The Russian dictator appears to have limited options left regarding the war in Ukraine. Even the support of his far-right American ally, Donald Trump, has not produced the expected results. Growing internal dissatisfaction and the possibility of pressure from a powerful new Moscow elite may now be reshaping the agenda of the new Tsar.
Diotima’s Analysis:
The new Russian strategy is no longer based solely on tanks, pipelines, or military force. It increasingly relies on political penetration, ideological polarization, digital propaganda, and the exploitation of social anger inside democratic societies.
Vladimir Putin seems to understand that modern democracies can collapse from within without a single invading army crossing their borders.
Russia’s strategic goal today is not simply territorial expansion. It is the weakening of European cohesion itself.
This explains why pro-Russian influence often appears simultaneously:
in far-right movements,
in anti-system populism,
in ultra-conservative religious networks,
and sometimes even within anti-Western factions of the radical Left.
The common denominator is not ideology.
It is destabilization.
Greece represents fertile ground for such influence due to historical Russophilia, Orthodox cultural bonds, anti-Western sentiment, distrust toward European institutions, and nationalist anxieties regarding Turkey.
The Kremlin no longer necessarily seeks obedient “Russian parties.” Instead, it supports:
centers of political instability,
personalities capable of intensifying public rage,
movements hostile to European integration,
and forces that can obstruct common European decisions.
This pattern is already visible across Europe: Marine Le Pen in France, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Robert Fico in Slovakia, and various nationalist movements across the Balkans.
At the same time, Russia is expanding aggressively into Africa and the Middle East, seeking strategic resources, military leverage, migration influence, and geopolitical disruption.
Yet democratic societies must also avoid another danger: the transformation of every dissenting voice into a suspected foreign agent.
The true defense against authoritarianism is not paranoia.
It is strong institutions, education, transparency, social justice, independent journalism, and citizens capable of distinguishing critical thought from manipulation.
Because the greatest ally of authoritarian power is not fear alone.
It is the exhausted society that abandons democratic vigilance.